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Abstract
In the subject of optimal stopping, the classical secretary problem is concerned
with optimally selecting the best of n candidates when their relative ranks are
observed sequentially. This problem has been extended to optimally selecting
the k-th best candidate for k ≥ 2. While the optimal stopping rule for k = 1, 2
(and all n ≥ 2) is known to be of threshold type (involving one threshold), we
solve the case k = 3 (and all n ≥ 3) by deriving an explicit optimal stopping
rule that involves two thresholds. We also prove several inequalities for p(k, n),
the maximum probability of selecting the k-th best of n candidates. It is shown
that (i) p(1, n) = p(n, n) > p(k, n) for 1 < k < n, (ii) p(k, n) ≥ p(k, n + 1), (iii)
p(k, n) ≥ p(k + 1, n+ 1), and (iv) p(k,∞) := limn→∞ p(k, n) is decreasing in k.
Keywords: secretary problem; best choice; backward induction; optimal stopping.
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1 Introduction
The classical secretary problem (also known as the best choice problem) has been exten-
sively studied in the literature on optimal stopping, which is usually described as follows.
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There are n (fixed) candidates to be interviewed sequentially in random order for one sec-
retarial position. It is assumed that these candidates can be ranked linearly without ties
by a manager (rank 1 being the best). Upon interviewing a candidate, the manager is only
able to observe the candidate’s (relative) rank among those that have been interviewed so
far. The manager then must decide whether to accept the present candidate (and stop in-
terviewing) or to reject the candidate (and continue interviewing). No recall is allowed. The
object is to maximize the probability of selecting the best candidate. More precisely, let Rj ,
j = 1, 2, . . . , n, be the absolute rank of the j-th candidate such that (R1, . . . , Rn) = σn with
probability 1/n! for every permutation σn of (1, 2, . . . , n). Define Xj = |{1 ≤ i ≤ j : Ri ≤
Rj}|, the relative rank of the j-th candidate among the first j candidates. It is desired to
find a stopping rule τ1,n ∈ Mn such that P (Rτ1,n = 1) = supτ∈Mn P (Rτ = 1) where Mn
denotes the set of all stopping rules adapted to the filtration {Fj}, Fj being the σ-algebra
generated by X1, X2, . . . , Xj. It is well known (cf. Lindley [6]) that the optimal stopping
rule τ1,n is of threshold type given by τ1,n = min{rn ≤ j ≤ n : Xj = 1} where min ∅ := n
and the threshold rn := min{j ≥ 1 :
∑n
i=j+1
1
i−1 ≤ 1}. Moreover, the maximum probability
of selecting the best candidate (under τ1,n) is p(1, n) :=
rn−1
n
∑n
i=rn
1
i−1 , which converges as
n→∞ to p(1,∞) := 1/e = limn→∞ rn/n.
A great many interesting variants of the secretary problem have been formulated and
solved in the literature (cf. the review papers by Ferguson [2] and Freeman [4] and Samuels
[9]), most of which are concerned with optimally selecting the best candidate or one of the k
best candidates. In contrast, only a few papers (cf. Rose [7], Szajowski [11] and Vanderbei
[12]) considered and solved the problem of optimally selecting the second best candidate.
(According to Vanderbei [12], in 1980, E.B. Dynkin proposed this problem to him with the
motivating story that “We are trying to hire a postdoc and we are confident that the best
candidate will receive and accept an offer from Harvard.” Thus Vanderbei [12] refers to the
problem as the postdoc variant of the secretary problem.) These authors showed that the
optimal stopping rule τ2,n is also of threshold type given by τ2,n = min{r′n ≤ j ≤ n : Xj = 2}
with r′n = ⌈n+12 ⌉ (the smallest integer not less than n+12 ), which attains the maximum
probability of selecting the second best candidate
p(2, n) := P (Rτ2,n = 2) = sup
τ∈Mn
P (Rτ = 2) =
(r′n − 1)(n− r′n + 1)
n(n− 1) .
Note that p(2,∞) = limn→∞ p(2, n) = 1/4 < 1/e = p(1,∞).
In this paper, we consider the problem of optimally selecting the k-th best candidate for
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general k. Let p(k, n) := supτ∈Mn P (Rτ = k), the maximum probability of selecting the
k-th best of n candidates. Szajowski [11] derived the asymptotic solutions as n → ∞ for
k = 3, 4, 5. Rose [8] dealt with the case k = (n + 1)/2 for odd n, which was called the
median problem and suggested by M. DeGroot with the motivation of selecting a candidate
representative of the entire sequence. (The candidate of rank k = (n+1)/2 is, in some sense,
representative of all candidates.) In the next section, we solve the case k = 3 for all finite
n ≥ 3 by showing (cf. Theorem 2.1) that the stopping rule τ3,n = min{an ≤ j ≤ n : Xj =
2} ∧ min{bn ≤ j ≤ n : Xj = 3} attains the maximum probability P (Rτ3,n = 3) = p(3, n)
for n ≥ 3, where x ∧ y := min{x, y} and the two thresholds an < bn are given in (2.8) and
(2.5), respectively. In Section 3, we prove (cf. Theorems 3.1 and 3.2) that (i) p(1, n) =
p(n, n) > p(k, n) for 1 < k < n, (ii) p(k, n) ≥ p(k, n+ 1), (iii) p(k, n) ≥ p(k + 1, n + 1), and
(iv) p(k,∞) := limn→∞ p(k, n) is decreasing in k. It is also noted (cf. Remark 3.1) that the
inequality p(k, n) ≥ p(k + 1, n) occasionally fails to hold for k close to (but less than) ⌈n
2
⌉.
Furthermore, we extend the result p(1, n) = p(n, n) > p(k, n) for 1 < k < n to the setting
where the goal is to select a candidate whose absolute rank belongs to a prescribed subset Γ
of {1, . . . , n} with |Γ| = c (1 ≤ c < n) (cf. Suchwalko and Szajowski [10]). It is shown (cf.
Theorem 3.3) that the probability of optimally selecting a candidate whose absolute rank
belongs to Γ is maximized when Γ = {1, . . . , c} or Γ = {n − c + 1, . . . , n}. The proofs of
several technical lemmas are relegated to Section 4. Section 5 contains a computer program
in Mathematica for verification of Theorem 2.1 for 3 ≤ n ≤ 31. It should be remarked
that the optimal stopping rule is not necessarily unique. For example, a slight modification
τ ′2,n of the optimal stopping rule τ2,n also attains the maximum probability p(2, n) where
τ ′2,n ≥ r′n− 1 is given by τ ′2,n = r′n− 1 if Xr′n−1 = 1 and τ ′2,n = τ2,n otherwise. The uniqueness
issue of the optimal stopping rule is not addressed in this paper.
2 Maximizing the probability of selecting the k-th best
candidate with k = 3
We adopt the setup and notations in Ferguson [3, Chapter 2]. As defined in Section 1, Xj
is the relative rank of the j-th candidate among the first j candidates and Rj is the absolute
rank. GivenX1 = x1, X2 = x2, . . . , Xj = xj , 1 ≤ j ≤ n, let yj(x1, x2, . . . , xj) be the return for
stopping at stage j (i.e. accepting the j-th candidate) and Vj(x1, x2, . . . , xj) the maximum
return by optimally stopping from stage j onwards. In other words, yj(x1, x2, . . . , xj) is the
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conditional probability of Rj = k (given Xi = xi, 1 ≤ i ≤ j), which defines the reward
function for the stopping problem of optimally selecting the k-th best candidate. Given
Xi = xi, 1 ≤ i ≤ j, Vj(x1, x2, . . . , xj) is the (maximum) expected reward by optimally
stopping from stage j onwards. Then Vn(x1, x2, . . . , xn) = yn(x1, x2, . . . , xn), and
Vj (x1, . . . , xj) = max
{
yj(x1, . . . , xj), E
(
Vj+1 (x1, . . . , xj , Xj+1)
∣∣∣X1 = x1, . . . , Xj = xj)} ,
(2.1)
for j = n − 1, n − 2, . . . , 1. Given Xi = xi, i = 1, . . . , j, it is optimal to stop at stage j if
Vj (x1, x2, . . . , xj) = yj(x1, x2, . . . , xj) and to continue otherwise. The (optimal) value of the
stopping problem is V1(1), i.e. V1(1) = supτ∈Mn P (Rτ = k). This formalizes the method of
backward induction. See also Chow, Robbins and Siegmund [1].
It is well known that X1, X2, . . . , Xn are independent and Xj has a uniform distribution
over {1, 2, . . . , j}. Given Xi = xi, i = 1, . . . , j, the conditional probability of Rj = k is the
same as the probability that a random sample of size j contains the k-th best candidate
whose (relative) rank in the sample is xj ; thus
P (Rj = k|X1 = x1, X2 = x2, . . . , Xj = xj) =
(
k−1
xj−1
)(
n−k
j−xj
)
(
n
j
) , (2.2)
where we adopt the usual convention that
(
m
ℓ
)
= 0 for m < ℓ.
From the independence of X1, X2, . . . , Xn, the conditional expectation on the right hand
side of (2.1) reduces to E(Vj+1(x1, x2, . . . , xj , Xj+1)). Note also that yj(x1, . . . , xj) depends
only on xj (cf. (2.2)), and so does Vj(x1, . . . , xj). Hence, we have
Vn(xn) = yn(xn)
and Vj(xj) = max
{
yj(xj),
1
j + 1
j+1∑
i=1
Vj+1(i)
}
for j = n− 1, n− 2, . . . , 1. (2.3)
Thus, it is optimal to stop at the first j with
yj(xj) ≥ 1
j + 1
j+1∑
i=1
Vj+1(i).
For the problem of optimally selecting the k-th best candidate with k = 3, we have
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yj(xj) = P (Rj = 3|X1 = x1, . . . , Xj = xj), which equals (cf. (2.2))
yj(xj) =


j(n− j − 1)(n− j)
n(n− 1)(n− 2) , if xj = 1;
2j(j − 1)(n− j)
n(n− 1)(n− 2) , if xj = 2;
j(j − 1)(j − 2)
n(n− 1)(n− 2) , if xj = 3;
0, otherwise.
(2.4)
Setting
∑m
i=ℓ ci := 0 whenever ℓ > m, define for n ≥ 3,
bn = min
{
j = 2, 3, . . . , n :
n∑
i=j+1
1
i− 2 ≤
1
2
}
, (2.5)
un = (bn − 2)(2n− 4)
n∑
i=bn
1
i− 2 , (2.6)
fn(x) = 3x
2 − (1 + 4n)x+ (n− 2)bn + 2(n+ 1) + un, (2.7)
an = min {j = 2, 3, . . . , n : fn(j) ≤ 0} . (2.8)
Remark 2.1. Note that 3 ≤ bn ≤ bn+1 ≤ bn + 1 for n ≥ 3, implying that fn(1) > 0 for all
n ≥ 3. In order for an in (2.8) to be well defined, we need to show that the second-order
polynomial equation fn(x) = 0 has two real roots x0 < y0 with ⌈x0⌉ ≤ y0 (so that an = ⌈x0⌉).
For 3 ≤ n ≤ 31, this can be verified by numerical computations. For n ≥ 32, we have
bn <
2n−1
3
and un ≤ (n − 2)bn (cf . (4.2) and (4.5)), implying that fn(2n−13 ) < 0 and
fn(
2n+2
3
) < 0. So, x0 <
2n−1
3
, implying that ⌈x0⌉ < 2n+23 < y0. With a little effort, it can be
shown that 2 ≤ an ≤ an+1 ≤ an + 1 for n ≥ 3.
The next theorem is our main result.
Theorem 2.1. For n ≥ 3, we have an < bn. Furthermore, the stopping rule
τ3,n = min{an ≤ j ≤ n : Xj = 2} ∧min{bn ≤ j ≤ n : Xj = 3}
maximizes the probability of selecting the 3rd best candidate.
Figure 1 illustrates the optimality of τ3,n for the case n = 13 with a13 = 7 and b13 = 9.
With the help of a computer program in Mathematica, we have verified Theorem 2.1 for
3 ≤ n ≤ 31 by numerically evaluating Vj(xj), j = n, n − 1, . . . , 1. (For completeness, the
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Figure 1: The optimality of τ3,13.
computer program is provided in Section 5.) While it seems intuitively reasonable for the
optimal stopping rule τ3,n to involve two thresholds for general n, the exact expressions
for the thresholds an and bn in (2.8) and (2.5) were found by some guesswork and tedious
analysis. To prove Theorem 2.1 for n ≥ 32, we need the following lemmas whose proofs are
relegated to Section 4.
Lemma 2.1. Let y0 be the larger root of the second-order polynomial equation fn(x) = 0.
Then for n ≥ 32, we have (i) an < bn; (ii) bn < y0; (iii) an > (n+ 4)/3.
Lemma 2.2. Given X1 = x1, X2 = x2, . . . , Xj = xj, let hj(xj) = hj(x1, x2, . . . , xj) be
the conditional probability of selecting the 3rd best candidate when τ3,n is used for stages
j, j + 1, . . . , n. Then for n ≥ 32,
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(i)
hj(xj) =


(an − 1) [a2n − (1 + 2n)an + (n− 2)bn + 2(n+ 1) + un]
n(n− 1)(n− 2) , if j < an;
yj(2), if j ≥ an and xj = 2;
j [j2 + (1− 2n)j + (n− 2)bn + 2 + un]
n(n− 1)(n− 2) , if an ≤ j ≤ bn − 1 and xj 6= 2;
yj(3), if j ≥ bn and xj = 3;
j(j − 1)
n(n− 1)(n− 2)
[
(2n− 4)
n∑
i=j+1
1
i− 2 − (n− j)
]
, if j ≥ bn and xj 6= 2, 3.
(ii)
1
j + 1
j+1∑
i=1
hj+1(i) =


(an − 1) [a2n − (1 + 2n)an + (n− 2)bn + 2(n+ 1) + un]
n(n− 1)(n− 2) , if j < an;
j [j2 + (1− 2n)j + (n− 2)bn + 2 + un]
n(n− 1)(n− 2) , if an ≤ j ≤ bn − 1;
j(j − 1)
n(n− 1)(n− 2)
[
(2n− 4)
n∑
i=j+1
1
i− 2 − (n− j)
]
, if bn ≤ j ≤ n− 1.
Lemma 2.3. For n ≥ 32, 1 ≤ j < an and 1 ≤ xj ≤ j, we have
yj(xj) <
1
j + 1
j+1∑
i=1
hj+1(i).
Lemma 2.4. For n ≥ 32 and an ≤ j < bn, we have (i) yj(2) ≥ 1j+1
∑j+1
i=1 hj+1(i); (ii)
yj(1) <
1
j+1
∑j+1
i=1 hj+1(i); (iii) yj(3) <
1
j+1
∑j+1
i=1 hj+1(i).
Lemma 2.5. For n ≥ 32 and bn ≤ j ≤ n − 1, we have (i) yj(1) < 1j+1
∑j+1
i=1 hj+1(i); (ii)
yj(2) ≥ 1j+1
∑j+1
i=1 hj+1(i); (iii) yj(3) ≥ 1j+1
∑j+1
i=1 hj+1(i).
Proof of Theorem 2.1. As remarked before, the theorem has been verified for 3 ≤ n ≤ 31
by numerical computations. For n ≥ 32, we need to show that hj satisfies
hj(xj) = max
{
yj(xj),
1
j + 1
j+1∑
i=1
hj+1(i)
}
for 1 ≤ j < n. (2.9)
Since hj(xj) is the conditional probability of selecting the 3rd best candidate when τ3,n is
used for stages j, . . . , n, we have hj(xj) =
1
j+1
∑j+1
i=1 hj+1(i) if either (j < an) or (an ≤ j < bn
and xj 6= 2) or (bn ≤ j < n and xj 6= 2, 3), which together with Lemmas 2.3 – 2.5 establishes
(2.9).
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Remark 2.2. Let d1 = limn→∞ an/n and d2 = limn→∞ bn/n. It is shown in Section 4 that
d1 =
2
2
√
e+
√
4e− 6√e ≈ 0.466 and d2 =
1√
e
≈ 0.606. (2.10)
It is also shown in Section 4 that as n → ∞, h1(1) = p(3, n), the maximum probability of
selecting the 3rd best candidate, tends to
p(3,∞) = 2d21(1− d1) =
8
(
2
√
e− 2 +
√
4e− 6√e
)
(
2
√
e +
√
4e− 6√e
)3 . (2.11)
Note that p(3,∞) ≈ 0.232 < 0.25 = p(2,∞). These limiting results agree with the asymptotic
solution for k = 3 in Szajowski [11].
3 Some results on p(k, n) and p(k,∞)
In this section, we present several inequalities for p(k, n) and p(k,∞) := limn→∞ p(k, n).
Theorem 3.1. For n ≥ 3 and 1 < k < n, we have p(1, n) = p(n, n) > p(k, n).
Proof. By symmetry, p(1, n) = p(n, n). (More generally, p(k, n) = p(n − k + 1, n).) For
the problem of selecting the k-th best candidate (1 < k < n), a (non-randomized) optimal
stopping rule τ is determined by a sequence of subsets {Sj} such that Sj ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , j} (j =
1, . . . , n) and τ = min{j : Xj ∈ Sj}. Since stopping at n is enforced (if τ > n− 1), we may
assume that Sn = {1, 2, . . . , n}. Thus,
P (Rτ = k) = p(k, n). (3.1)
Define, for j = 1, . . . , n− 1,
S ′j =


∅, if Sj = ∅;
{1}, if Sj 6= ∅;
and S ′n = {1, 2, . . . , n}. Let τ ′ = min{j : Xj ∈ S ′j}, which, as a stopping rule, may be applied
to selecting the best candidate. Thus
P (Rτ ′ = 1) ≤ sup
ν∈Mn
P (Rν = 1) = p(1, n). (3.2)
Note that for j = 1, . . . , n,
P (Rj = 1, Xj = 1) =
1
n
= P (Rj = k)
≥ P (Rj = k,Xj ∈ Sj). (3.3)
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By (2.2), given X1 = x1, . . . , Xj = xj , the conditional distribution of Rj depends only on xj ,
implying that X1, . . . , Xj−1 and (Xj, Rj) are independent. So if Sj 6= ∅,
P (τ = j, Rj = k) = P (Xi /∈ Si, i = 1, . . . , j − 1, Xj ∈ Sj , Rj = k)
=
[
j−1∏
i=1
P (Xi /∈ Si)
]
P (Xj ∈ Sj , Rj = k)
≤
[
j−1∏
i=1
P (Xi /∈ S ′i)
]
P (Xj = 1, Rj = 1) (3.4)
= P (τ ′ = j, Rj = 1),
where the inequality follows from (3.3) and |S ′i| ≤ |Si| for all i. (If Sj = ∅, then P (τ =
j, Rj = k) = P (τ
′ = j, Rj = 1) = 0.) By (3.1), (3.2) and (3.4), we have
p(k, n) = P (Rτ = k) =
n∑
j=1
P (τ = j, Rj = k)
≤
n∑
j=1
P (τ ′ = j, Rj = 1) = P (Rτ ′ = 1) ≤ p(1, n). (3.5)
It remains to show that (at least) one of the two inequalities in (3.5) is strict (so that
p(k, n) < p(1, n)). If the stopping rule τ ′ is not optimal for selecting the best candidate, then
the second inequality in (3.5) is strict. Suppose τ ′ is optimal for selecting the best candidate,
which implies, in view of n ≥ 3, that S ′1 = ∅ and S ′n−1 = {1}, which in turn implies that
|Sn−1| ≥ 1. If |Sn−1| ≥ 2, then the inequality in (3.4) is strict for j = n, implying that the
first inequality in (3.5) is strict. Suppose Sn−1 = {ℓ} for some ℓ. Then we have
P (Rn−1 = k,Xn−1 = ℓ) =


n−k
n(n−1) , if k = ℓ;
k−1
n(n−1) , if k = ℓ+ 1;
0, if k − ℓ 6= 0, 1;
implying, in view of 1 < k < n, that the inequality in (3.3) is strict for j = n − 1, which
in turn implies that the inequality in (3.4) is strict for j = n − 1. It follows that the first
inequality in (3.5) is strict. The proof is complete.
Theorem 3.2. For 1 ≤ k ≤ n, we have p(k, n) ≥ p(k, n+ 1) (i.e. p(k, n) is decreasing in n)
and p(k, n) ≥ p(k + 1, n + 1). Furthermore, p(k,∞) := limn→∞ p(k, n) is well defined, and
p(k,∞) ≥ p(k + 1,∞).
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Proof. (i) To show p(k, n) ≥ p(k, n+1), consider the case of selecting the k-th best of n+1
candidates. Let the random variable I ∈ {1, . . . , n + 1} be such that RI = n + 1 (i.e. the
worst candidate is the I-th person to be interviewed). If I is known to the manager (or
more precisely, the manager knows the position of the worst candidate before the interview
process begins), then the problem of optimally selecting the k-th best of the n+1 candidates
is equivalent to that of optimally selecting the k-th best of the n candidates (excluding the
worst one). (Indeed, let X ′i = Xi for 1 ≤ i < I and X ′i = Xi+1 for I ≤ i ≤ n. Given
I, X ′1, . . . , X
′
n are (conditionally) independent with each X
′
i being uniform over {1, . . . , i}.)
Thus, when I is known to the manager, the maximum probability of selecting the k-th
best candidate equals p(k, n), which must be at least as large as p(k, n + 1), the maximum
probability of selecting the k-th best of the n + 1 candidates when I is unavailable. This
proves that p(k, n) ≥ p(k, n+ 1).
(ii) To show p(k, n) ≥ p(k + 1, n+ 1), note that
p(k, n) = p(n− k + 1, n) ≥ p(n + 1− k, n+ 1) = p(k + 1, n+ 1), (3.6)
where the two equalities follow from the symmetry property p(k, n) = p(n − k + 1, n) and
the inequality follows from the decreasing property of p(k, n) in n.
(iii) Since p(k, n) is decreasing in n, p(k,∞) := limn→∞ p(k, n) is well defined. By (3.6),
we have
p(k,∞) = lim
n→∞
p(k, n) ≥ lim
n→∞
p(k + 1, n+ 1) = p(k + 1,∞).
The proof is complete.
Remark 3.1. We conjecture that the three inequalities in Theorem 3.2 are all strict. While
p(k, n) is decreasing in n, in view of p(1, n) > p(k, n) for 1 < k < n and p(k,∞) ≥
p(k + 1,∞), it may be tempting to conjecture that p(k, n) ≥ p(k + 1, n) for 1 ≤ k < ⌈n
2
⌉.
However, this inequality occasionally fails to hold for k close to (but less than) ⌈n
2
⌉. Our
numerical results show that the set {(k, n) : 1 ≤ k < ⌈n
2
⌉, n ≤ 50, p(k, n) < p(k + 1, n)}
consists of (2, 5), (2, 7), (7, 15), (9, 19), (10, 21), (12, 25), (21, 43), (22, 47), (24, 49) and (24, 50).
Moreover, it can be shown that p(2, n) > p(3, n) for all n ≥ 8. Let ρ = lim infn→∞K(n)/n
where K(n) = max{1 ≤ k ≤ ⌈n
2
⌉ : p(1, n) ≥ p(2, n) ≥ · · · ≥ p(k, n)}. While 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1/2, it
appears to be a challenging task to find the exact value of ρ. Our limited numerical results
suggest that ρ may be equal to 1/2.
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Remark 3.2. It may be of interest to see how fast p(k,∞) tends to 0 as k increases. By
considering some suboptimal rules, we have derived a crude lower bound k
−k
k−1 for p(k,∞).
The details are omitted.
The next theorem extends Theorem 3.1 to the setting where the goal is to select a
candidate whose rank belongs to a prescribed subset Γ of {1, . . . , n} (cf. Suchwalko and
Szajowski [10]). Let
p(Γ, n) = sup
τ∈Mn
P (Rτ ∈ Γ).
Theorem 3.3. For any subset Γ of {1, 2, . . . , n} with |Γ| = c (1 ≤ c < n), we have
p(Γ, n) ≤ p({1, 2, . . . , c}, n) = p({n− c+ 1, . . . , n}, n).
In the proof below, it is convenient to take the convention that
(
0
0
)
:= 1 and
(
n
k
)
:= 0 if
n < k or n < 0 or k < 0, so that(
n
k
)
=
(
n− 1
k
)
+
(
n− 1
k − 1
)
for (k, n) ∈ Z× Z\{(0, 0)}, (3.7)
and (
n
k
)
≥
(
n− 1
k
)
+
(
n− 1
k − 1
)
for (k, n) ∈ Z× Z, (3.8)
where Z is the set of all integers.
Proof of Theorem 3.3. As in the proof of Theorem 3.1, let τ be a (non-randomized)
optimal stopping rule determined by a sequence of subsets {Sj} of {1, . . . , n} such that
Sj ⊂ {1, . . . , j}, τ = min{j : Xj ∈ Sj} and P (Rτ ∈ Γ) = p(Γ, n). Again, as stopping at n is
enforced (if τ > n− 1), we may assume that Sn = {1, 2, . . . , n}. Let S ′j = {1, 2, . . . , |Sj|}, so
|S ′j| = |Sj| (in particular, S ′j = ∅ if Sj = ∅). Let τ ′ = min{j : Xj ∈ S ′j}. Claim
P (Rj ∈ {t1, t2, . . . , tc}, Xj ∈ {s1, s2, . . . , sd}) ≤ P (Rj ∈ {1, 2, . . . , c}, Xj ∈ {1, 2, . . . , d})
(3.9)
for 1 ≤ d ≤ j ≤ n, 1 ≤ c ≤ n, 1 ≤ t1 < t2 < · · · < tc ≤ n, and 1 ≤ s1 < s2 < · · · < sd ≤ j. If
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the claim (3.9) is true, then for j = 1, . . . , n,
P (τ = j, Rj ∈ Γ) = P (Xi /∈ Si, i = 1, . . . , j − 1, Xj ∈ Sj, Rj ∈ Γ)
=
[
j−1∏
i=1
P (Xi /∈ Si)
]
P (Rj ∈ Γ, Xj ∈ Sj)
≤
[
j−1∏
i=1
P (Xi /∈ S ′i)
]
P (Rj ∈ {1, . . . , c}, Xj ∈ S ′j) (by (3.9))
= P (Xi /∈ S ′i, i = 1, . . . , j − 1, Xj ∈ S ′j , Rj ∈ {1, . . . , c})
= P (τ ′ = j, Rj ∈ {1, . . . , c}),
implying that p(Γ, n) = P (Rτ ∈ Γ) ≤ P (Rτ ′ ∈ {1, . . . , c}) ≤ p({1, . . . , c}, n).
It remains to establish (3.9). Note that
P (Rj ∈ {t1, . . . , tc}, Xj ∈ {s1, . . . , sd})
≤ P (Rj ∈ {t1, . . . , tc}) = c
n
= P (Rj ∈ {1, . . . , c})
= P (Rj ∈ {1, . . . , c}, Xj ∈ {1, . . . , d}) (if d ≥ c),
showing that (3.9) holds for d ≥ c. Since
P (Rj = a,Xj = b) =
(
a−1
b−1
)(
n−a
j−b
)
n
(
n−1
j−1
) for all integers a > 0, b > 0,
(3.9) is equivalent to
d∑
i=1
c∑
ℓ=1
(
tℓ − 1
si − 1
)(
n− tℓ
j − si
)
≤
d∑
i=1
c∑
ℓ=1
(
ℓ− 1
i− 1
)(
n− ℓ
j − i
)
, (3.10)
for 1 ≤ d ≤ j ≤ n, 1 ≤ c ≤ n, 1 ≤ t1 < · · · < tc ≤ n and 1 ≤ s1 < · · · < sd ≤ j. Note
that (3.10) holds for d ≥ c (since (3.9) does for d ≥ c). Also, from (n−tℓ
j−si
)
= 0 for tℓ > n or
si > j, it follows easily that for fixed n, if (3.10) holds for all (j, c, d, t1, . . . , tc, s1, . . . , sd) with
1 ≤ d ≤ j ≤ n, 1 ≤ c ≤ n, 1 ≤ t1 < · · · < tc ≤ n and 1 ≤ s1 < · · · < sd ≤ j, then (3.10) holds
for all (j, c, d, t1, . . . , tc, s1, . . . , sd) with 1 ≤ j ≤ n, 1 ≤ t1 < · · · < tc and 1 ≤ s1 < · · · < sd.
This (trivial) observation is needed later. To prove (3.10), we proceed by induction on n.
For n = 1, necessarily j = 1 and c = d = 1 (since 1 ≤ d ≤ j ≤ n and 1 ≤ c ≤ n). So (3.10)
holds for n = 1.
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Suppose (3.10) holds for (fixed) n ≥ 1 and for all (j, c, d, t1, . . . , tc, s1, . . . , sd) with 1 ≤
d ≤ j ≤ n, 1 ≤ c ≤ n, 1 ≤ t1 < · · · < tc ≤ n and 1 ≤ s1 < · · · < sd ≤ j (and hence for all
(j, c, d, t1, . . . , tc, s1, . . . , sd) with 1 ≤ j ≤ n, 1 ≤ t1 < · · · < tc and 1 ≤ s1 < · · · < sd). We
need to show that (3.10) holds for n+ 1 (with 1 ≤ d < c), i.e.
d∑
i=1
c∑
ℓ=1
(
tℓ − 1
si − 1
)(
n− tℓ + 1
j − si
)
≤
d∑
i=1
c∑
ℓ=1
(
ℓ− 1
i− 1
)(
n− ℓ+ 1
j − i
)
, (3.11)
for 1 ≤ d ≤ j ≤ n + 1, 1 ≤ d < c ≤ n + 1, 1 ≤ t1 < t2 < · · · < tc ≤ n + 1 and
1 ≤ s1 < s2 < · · · < sd ≤ j. If j = 1, then necessarily d = 1 and s1 = 1, so that both sides
of (3.11) equal c, implying that (3.11) holds for j = 1. For j = n + 1, the left hand side of
(3.11) equals
d∑
i=1
c∑
ℓ=1
(
tℓ − 1
si − 1
)(
n− tℓ + 1
n− si + 1
)
≤ d,
since the two inequalities tℓ − 1 ≥ si − 1 and n− tℓ + 1 ≥ n− si + 1 hold simultaneously if
and only if tℓ = si. The right hand side of (3.11) equals
d∑
i=1
c∑
ℓ=1
(
ℓ− 1
i− 1
)(
n− ℓ+ 1
n− i+ 1
)
= d,
since
(
ℓ−1
i−1
)(
n−ℓ+1
n−i+1
)
= 1 or 0 according to whether i = ℓ or i 6= ℓ. Thus, (3.11) holds for
j = n + 1.
We now consider 2 ≤ j ≤ n. Suppose n− tc + 1 = j − sd = 0. Then the left hand side of
(3.11) equals
d∑
i=1
c−1∑
ℓ=1
(
tℓ − 1
si − 1
)(
n− tℓ + 1
j − si
)
+
(
n
j − 1
)
=
d∑
i=1
c−1∑
ℓ=1
(
tℓ − 1
si − 1
)[(
n− tℓ
j − si
)
+
(
n− tℓ
j − si − 1
)]
+
(
n
j − 1
)
(by (3.7))
=
d∑
i=1
c−1∑
ℓ=1
(
tℓ − 1
si − 1
)(
n− tℓ
j − si
)
+
d−1∑
i=1
c−1∑
ℓ=1
(
tℓ − 1
si − 1
)(
n− tℓ
(j − 1)− si
)
+
(
n
j − 1
)
. (3.12)
By the induction hypothesis (applied to each of the two double sums), (3.12) is less than or
equal to
d∑
i=1
c−1∑
ℓ=1
(
ℓ− 1
i− 1
)(
n− ℓ
j − i
)
+
d−1∑
i=1
c−1∑
ℓ=1
(
ℓ− 1
i− 1
)(
n− ℓ
(j − 1)− i
)
+
(
n
j − 1
)
=
d−1∑
i=1
c−1∑
ℓ=1
(
ℓ− 1
i− 1
)[(
n− ℓ
j − i
)
+
(
n− ℓ
j − i− 1
)]
+
c−1∑
ℓ=1
(
ℓ− 1
d− 1
)(
n− ℓ
j − d
)
+
(
n
j − 1
)
,
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which by (3.7) is equal to
d−1∑
i=1
c−1∑
ℓ=1
(
ℓ− 1
i− 1
)(
n− ℓ+ 1
j − i
)
+
c−1∑
ℓ=d
(
ℓ− 1
d− 1
)(
n− ℓ
j − d
)
+
(
n
j − 1
)
. (3.13)
We need the following identity
c∑
i=d+1
(
c− 1
i− 1
)(
n− c+ 1
j − i
)
=
c−1∑
ℓ=d
(
ℓ− 1
d− 1
)(
n− ℓ
j − d− 1
)
, (3.14)
which holds by observing that the left hand side is the total number of subsets of {1, . . . , n}
with j−1 elements and with the d-th smallest element less than c while the term (ℓ−1
d−1
)(
n−ℓ
j−d−1
)
on the right hand side is the number of subsets of {1, . . . , n} with j − 1 elements and with
the d-th smallest element being ℓ. In view of (3.14),
(
n
j − 1
)
=
d∑
i=1
(
c− 1
i− 1
)(
n− c+ 1
j − i
)
+
c∑
i=d+1
(
c− 1
i− 1
)(
n− c+ 1
j − i
)
=
d∑
i=1
(
c− 1
i− 1
)(
n− c+ 1
j − i
)
+
c−1∑
ℓ=d
(
ℓ− 1
d− 1
)(
n− ℓ
j − d− 1
)
. (3.15)
We have shown that the left hand side of (3.11) is less than or equal to (3.13), which by
(3.15) equals
d−1∑
i=1
c−1∑
ℓ=1
(
ℓ− 1
i− 1
)(
n− ℓ+ 1
j − i
)
+
c−1∑
ℓ=d
(
ℓ− 1
d− 1
)[(
n− ℓ
j − d
)
+
(
n− ℓ
j − d− 1
)]
+
d∑
i=1
(
c− 1
i− 1
)(
n− c+ 1
j − i
)
=
d−1∑
i=1
c−1∑
ℓ=1
(
ℓ− 1
i− 1
)(
n− ℓ+ 1
j − i
)
+
c−1∑
ℓ=d
(
ℓ− 1
d− 1
)(
n− ℓ+ 1
j − d
)
+
d∑
i=1
(
c− 1
i− 1
)(
n− c + 1
j − i
)
(by (3.7))
=
d∑
i=1
c∑
ℓ=1
(
ℓ− 1
i− 1
)(
n− ℓ+ 1
j − i
)
,
establishing (3.11) for the case that 2 ≤ j ≤ n and n− tc + 1 = j − sd = 0.
It remains to deal with the case that 2 ≤ j ≤ n and (n− tc+1, j− sd) 6= (0, 0) (implying
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that (n− tℓ + 1, j − si) 6= (0, 0) for all i, ℓ). By (3.7), the left hand side of (3.11) equals
d∑
i=1
c∑
ℓ=1
(
tℓ − 1
si − 1
)(
n− tℓ
j − si
)
+
d∑
i=1
c∑
ℓ=1
(
tℓ − 1
si − 1
)(
n− tℓ
(j − 1)− si
)
≤
d∑
i=1
c∑
ℓ=1
(
ℓ− 1
i− 1
)(
n− ℓ
j − i
)
+
d∑
i=1
c∑
ℓ=1
(
ℓ− 1
i− 1
)(
n− ℓ
(j − 1)− i
)
(by the induction hypothesis)
=
d∑
i=1
c∑
ℓ=1
(
ℓ− 1
i− 1
)[(
n− ℓ
j − i
)
+
(
n− ℓ
j − i− 1
)]
≤
d∑
i=1
c∑
ℓ=1
(
ℓ− 1
i− 1
)(
n− ℓ+ 1
j − i
)
(by (3.8)).
Note that the first inequality follows from the induction hypothesis applied to each of the
two double sums where tc > n or sd > j−1 is possible. (Recall that the induction hypothesis
applies to all (j, c, d, t1, . . . , tc, s1, . . . , sd) with 1 ≤ j ≤ n, 1 ≤ t1 < · · · < tc and 1 ≤ s1 <
· · · < sd.) The proof is complete.
Remark 3.3. As pointed out by a referee, the identities (3.14) and (3.15) are variants of
Chu-Vandermonde convolution formula. (See the first identity in Table 169 of Graham et al.
[5].)
4 Proofs of Lemmas 2.1–2.5 and (2.10)–(2.11)
To prove Lemmas 2.1–2.5, we need the following lemma.
Lemma 4.1. For n ≥ 32, we have
n− 1√
e
+ 1 < bn <
n− 3
2√
e
+
5
2
. (4.1)
In particular,
n+ 5
2
< bn <
2n− 1
3
. (4.2)
Proof. By (2.5), we have
1
2
<
n∑
i=bn
1
i− 2 =
n−2∑
i=bn−2
1
i
<
∫ n− 3
2
bn− 52
dx
x
= log
(
n− 3
2
bn − 52
)
(4.3)
and
1
2
≥
n∑
i=bn+1
1
i− 2 =
n−2∑
i=bn−1
1
i
>
∫ n−1
bn−1
dx
x
= log
(
n− 1
bn − 1
)
. (4.4)
15
By (4.3), we have bn <
n− 3
2√
e
+ 5
2
; and from (4.4), bn >
n−1√
e
+ 1, establishing (4.1). Since
n− 3
2√
e
+ 5
2
< 2n−1
3
and n−1√
e
+ 1 > n+5
2
(for n ≥ 32), we have n+5
2
< bn <
2n−1
3
. The proof is
complete.
From (2.5) and (2.6), we have
(bn − 2)(n− 2) = (bn − 2)(2n− 4)
2
< un = 2n− 4 + (bn − 2)(2n− 4)
n∑
i=bn+1
1
i− 2
≤ 2n− 4 + (bn − 2)(2n− 4)
2
= bn(n− 2),
i.e.
(bn − 2)(n− 2) < un ≤ bn(n− 2). (4.5)
Remark 4.1. The assumption of n ≥ 32 is needed for Lemmas 2.1–2.5 since the following
proofs of the lemmas rely on (4.2).
Proof of Lemma 2.1. (i) Note (cf. Remark 2.1) that an = ⌈x0⌉ < x0 + 1 where x0 is the
smaller root of fn(x) = 0. We now show fn(bn − 1) < 0 (which implies that an < x0 + 1 <
(bn − 1) + 1 = bn). We have
fn(bn − 1) = 3(bn − 1)2 − (1 + 4n)(bn − 1) + (n− 2)bn + 2(n+ 1) + un
≤ 3(bn − 1)2 − (1 + 4n)(bn − 1) + (n− 2)bn + 2(n+ 1) + bn(n− 2) (by (4.5))
= (bn − 3) [3bn − (2n+ 2)] < 0 (by (4.2)).
This proves (i).
(ii) Note that
fn(bn) ≤ 3b2n − (1 + 4n)bn + (n− 2)bn + 2(n+ 1) + bn(n− 2)
= (bn − 1) [3bn − (2n+ 2)] < 0 (by (4.2)).
This proves that bn < y0.
(iii) By (4.2) and (ii), y0 > bn >
n+5
2
> n+4
3
. We now show fn
(
n+4
3
)
> 0 (which implies
that n+4
3
< x0 ≤ ⌈x0⌉ = an). By (4.5),
fn
(
n + 4
3
)
= −n2 − 3n+ 4 + (n− 2)bn + 2(n+ 1) + un
> −n2 − 3n+ 4 + (n− 2)bn + 2(n+ 1) + (bn − 2)(n− 2) (by (4.5))
= (n− 2) (2bn − (n+ 5)) > 0 (by (4.2)).
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The proof is complete.
Proof of Lemma 2.2. By Lemma 2.1, an < bn. (i) Let
Qi = {Xℓ 6= 2 for an ≤ ℓ ≤ i− 1, Xi = 2}, an ≤ i ≤ bn − 1;
Q′i = {Xℓ 6= 2 for an ≤ ℓ ≤ bn − 1, Xℓ 6= 2, 3 for bn ≤ ℓ ≤ i− 1, Xi = 2}, i ≥ bn;
and Q′′i = {Xℓ 6= 2 for an ≤ ℓ ≤ bn − 1, Xℓ 6= 2, 3 for bn ≤ ℓ ≤ i− 1, Xi = 3}, i ≥ bn.
Since Xℓ is uniformly distributed over {1, 2, . . . , ℓ}, the X ′ℓs are independent and Ri is con-
ditionally independent of X1, . . . , Xi−1 given Xi, we have
P (Qi) =
(an − 1)
i(i− 1) , P (Ri = 3|Qi) = yi(2) for an ≤ i ≤ bn − 1,
P (Q′i) = P (Q
′′
i ) =
(an − 1)(bn − 2)
i(i− 1)(i− 2) , P (Ri = 3|Q
′
i) = yi(2), P (Ri = 3|Q′′i ) = yi(3), for i ≥ bn.
Thus, by (2.4) and (2.6), for j < an,
hj(xj) =
n∑
i=an
P (Ri = 3 and the i-th candidate is selected under τ3,n)
=
bn−1∑
i=an
P (Qi)P (Ri = 3|Qi) +
n∑
i=bn
[
P (Q′i)P (Ri = 3|Q′i) + P (Q′′i )P (Ri = 3|Q′′i )
]
=
bn−1∑
i=an
(an − 1)
i(i− 1) yi(2) +
n∑
i=bn
[
(an − 1)(bn − 2)
i(i− 1)(i− 2) (yi(2) + yi(3))
]
=
an − 1
n(n− 1)(n− 2)
[
bn−1∑
i=an
2(n− i) + (bn − 2)
n∑
i=bn
2n− i− 2
i− 2
]
=
an − 1
n(n− 1)(n− 2)
[
(2n− an − bn + 1)(bn − an)− (bn − 2)(n− bn + 1)
+(bn − 2)(2n− 4)
n∑
i=bn
1
i− 2
]
=
(an − 1) [a2n − (1 + 2n)an + (n− 2)bn + 2(n+ 1) + un]
n(n− 1)(n− 2) =: cn. (4.6)
This proves (i) for j < an. The other cases can be treated similarly.
(ii) By (i), for j < an − 1, hj+1(i) does not depend on i, so that 1j+1
∑j+1
i=1 hj+1(i) = cn.
To establish the identity for j = an − 1, we have by (i) that han(2) = yan(2) and
han(i) =
an (a
2
n + (1− 2n)an + (n− 2)bn + 2 + un)
n(n− 1)(n− 2) for i 6= 2 with 1 ≤ i ≤ an.
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So,
1
an
an∑
i=1
han(i) =
1
an
{
yan(2) + (an − 1)
[
an (a
2
n + (1− 2n)an + (n− 2)bn + 2 + un)
n(n− 1)(n− 2)
]}
=
1
an
{
2an(an − 1)(n− an)
n(n− 1)(n− 2) + (an − 1)
[
an (a
2
n + (1− 2n)an + (n− 2)bn + 2 + un)
n(n− 1)(n− 2)
]}
=
(an − 1) [a2n − (1 + 2n)an + (n− 2)bn + 2(n + 1) + un]
n(n− 1)(n− 2) = cn.
This proves (ii) for the case j < an. The other cases can be treated similarly.
Proof of Lemma 2.3. Since, by Lemma 2.2(ii), 1
j+1
∑j+1
i=1 hj+1(i) = cn for j < an where cn
is defined in (4.6), we need to show
max{yj(i) : i = 1, 2, 3, j < an} < cn, (4.7)
where yj(i) is given in (2.4). Since yj(2) > yj(3) if and only if 2(n−j) > j−2 (i.e. j < 2n+23 )
and, since by Lemma 2.1(i) and (4.2), an < bn <
2n−1
3
, we have yj(2) > yj(3) for j < an,
implying that
max
j<an
yj(2) > max
j<an
yj(3). (4.8)
Noting that yj(1) ≥ yj+1(1) if and only if j ≥ n−23 , we have
max
1≤j≤n
yj(1) = y⌈n−2
3
⌉(1) ≤ y⌈n−2
3
⌉+1(2),
where the inequality is due to the fact that yj(1) ≤ yj+1(2) for j ≥ (n − 2)/3. By Lemma
2.1(iii), an >
n+4
3
> ⌈n−2
3
⌉ + 1. So,
max
1≤j≤n
yj(1) = y⌈n−2
3
⌉(1) ≤ y⌈n−2
3
⌉+1(2) ≤ max
j<an
yj(2). (4.9)
Moreover, yj(2) ≤ yj+1(2) if and only if j ≤ ⌊2n−13 ⌋, which together with an < 2n−13 implies
that
max
j<an
yj(2) = yan−1(2). (4.10)
In view of (4.8), (4.9) and (4.10), (4.7) holds if we can show that
yan−1(2) < cn,
i.e.
3a2n − (4n+ 7)an + (n− 2)bn + 6(n+ 1) + un > 0,
which is equivalent to fn(an − 1) > 0. This holds by (2.8). The proof is complete.
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Proof of Lemma 2.4. (i) Note that
n(n− 1)(n− 2)
j
[
yj(2)− 1
j + 1
j+1∑
i=1
hj+1(i)
]
= 2(j − 1)(n− j)− j2 − (1− 2n)j − (n− 2)bn − 2− un
= −3j2 + (1 + 4n)j − (n− 2)bn − 2(n+ 1)− un
= −fn(j) ≥ 0,
where the inequality holds since fn(j) ≤ 0 for x0 ≤ an ≤ j < bn < y0 where x0 and y0 denote
the two roots of fn(x) = 0.
(ii) Note that
n(n− 1)(n− 2)
j
[
yj(1)− 1
j + 1
j+1∑
i=1
hj+1(i)
]
=(n− j − 1)(n− j)− j2 − (1− 2n)j − (n− 2)bn − 2− un
=n2 − n− (n− 2)bn − 2− un
<n2 − n− (n− 2)bn − 2− (bn − 2)(n− 2) (by (4.5))
=(n− 2)(n+ 3− 2bn) < 0 (by (4.2)).
This proves (ii).
(iii) Note that
n(n− 1)(n− 2)
j
[
yj(3)− 1
j + 1
j+1∑
i=1
hj+1(i)
]
= (j − 1)(j − 2)− j2 − (1− 2n)j − (n− 2)bn − 2− un
= (n− 2)(2j − bn)− un
< (n− 2)(2j − bn)− (bn − 2)(n− 2) (by (4.5))
= 2(n− 2)(j + 1− bn) ≤ 0,
where the last inequality follows since j ≤ bn − 1. The proof is complete.
Proof of Lemma 2.5. We claim that
j − 1
n− j
n∑
i=j+1
1
i− 2 is increasing in 2 ≤ j < n; (4.11)
and
1
n− j
n∑
i=j+1
1
i− 2 is decreasing in 2 ≤ j < n. (4.12)
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Note that for j = 2, . . . , n− 2,
j − 1
n− j
n∑
i=j+1
1
i− 2 −
j
n− j − 1
n∑
i=j+2
1
i− 2 =
1
n− j −
n− 1
(n− j)(n− j − 1)
n∑
i=j+2
1
i− 2
=
n− 1
n− j
(
1
n− 1 −
1
n− j − 1
n∑
i=j+2
1
i− 2
)
< 0,
establishing (4.11). A similar argument yields (4.12).
(i) By (2.4) and Lemma 2.2(ii), for bn ≤ j ≤ n− 1,
n(n− 1)(n− 2)
j
[
yj(1)− 1
j + 1
j+1∑
i=1
hj+1(i)
]
=(n− j − 1)(n− j)− (j − 1)
[
(2n− 4)
n∑
i=j+1
1
i− 2 − (n− j)
]
=(n− j)(n− 2)
[
1− 2(j − 1)
n− j
n∑
i=j+1
1
i− 2
]
≤(n− j)
[
1− 2(bn − 1)
n− bn
n∑
i=bn+1
1
i− 2
]
(by (4.11))
<(n− j)
[
1− 2(bn − 1)
n− 2
]
<0 (since bn >
n+5
2
by (4.2)).
This proves (i).
(ii) By (2.4) and Lemma 2.2(ii), for bn ≤ j ≤ n− 1,
n(n− 1)(n− 2)
j(j − 1)
[
yj(2)− 1
j + 1
j+1∑
i=1
hj+1(i)
]
= 3(n− j)− (2n− 4)
n∑
i=j+1
1
i− 2
= (n− j)
[
3− 2n− 4
n− j
n∑
i=j+1
1
i− 2
]
≥ (n− j)
[
3− 2n− 4
n− bn
n∑
i=bn+1
1
i− 2
]
(by (4.12))
≥ (n− j)
[
3− n− 2
n− bn
]
(by (2.5))
> 0 (since bn < (2n− 1)/3 by (4.2)).
This proves (ii).
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(iii) By (2.4) and Lemma 2.2(ii), for bn ≤ j ≤ n− 1,
n(n− 1)(n− 2)
j(j − 1)
[
yj(3)− 1
j + 1
j+1∑
i=1
hj+1(i)
]
= n− 2− (2n− 4)
n∑
i=j+1
1
i− 2
= (n− 2)
[
1− 2
n∑
i=j+1
1
i− 2
]
≥ (n− 2)
[
1− 2
n∑
i=bn+1
1
i− 2
]
≥ 0 (by (2.5)).
The proof is complete.
Proof of (2.10)–(2.11). It follows immediately from Lemma 4.1 that d2 = 1/
√
e. Let x0
be the smaller root of fn(x) = 0, i.e.
x0 : =
(1 + 4n)−√(1 + 4n)2 − 12[(n− 2)bn + 2(n+ 1) + un]
6
=
2[(n− 2)bn + 2(n + 1) + un]
1 + 4n+
√
(1 + 4n)2 − 12[(n− 2)bn + 2(n+ 1) + un]
. (4.13)
Since bn
n
→ d2 = 1/√e and
∑n
i=bn
1
i−2 →
∫ 1
1/
√
e
dx
x
= 1
2
as n→∞,
un
n2
=
(bn − 2)(2n− 4)
n2
n∑
i=bn
1
i− 2 → d2 as n→∞. (4.14)
By (4.13), (4.14) and an = ⌈x0⌉, we have
d1 = lim
n→∞
an
n
= lim
n→∞
x0
n
=
2d2
2 +
√
4− 6d2
=
2
2
√
e+
√
4e− 6√e,
proving (2.10). By Lemma 2.2(i),
p(3, n) = h1(1) =
(an − 1)[a2n − (1 + 2n)an + (n− 2)bn + 2(n+ 1) + un]
n(n− 1)(n− 2) ,
which together with (2.11) and (4.14) yields
p(3,∞) = lim
n→∞
p(3, n) = d1(d
2
1 − 2d1 + 2d2) = 2d21(1− d1) =
8
(
2
√
e− 2 +
√
4e− 6√e
)
(
2
√
e +
√
4e− 6√e
)3 ,
proving (2.11).
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5 A computer program in Mathematica for verification
of Theorem 2.1 for 3 ≤ n ≤ 31
Clear[f, u, n, j, x];
For[n = 3, n < 32, n++,
u[n , j , x ]:=Which
[
x == 1, (n−j+1)∗(j−2)∗(j−1)
n∗(n−1)∗(n−2) , x == 2,
2∗(n−j+1)∗(n−j)∗(j−1)
n∗(n−1)∗(n−2) ,
, x == 3, (n−j+1)∗(n−j)∗(n−j−1)
n∗(n−1)∗(n−2) ,True, 0
]
;
For[j = 1, j ≤ n, j++,
For[x = 1, x ≤ n, x++,
f [n, j, x] = If
[
j > 1,Max
[
u[n, j, x], 1
n−j+2 ∗
(∑n−j+2
i=1 f [n, j − 1, i]
)]
,Which[x == 3, 1, x 6= 3, 0]
]
6 6
] (*This sets the values backwards*)
]
]
Clear[y, v, b, n];
y[n , j , x ]:=u[n, n+ 1− j, x]; (*Define the conditional probability y*)
v[n , j , x ]:=f [n, n+ 1− j, x]; (*Define the value function*)
b[3] = 3; (*Define the threshold bn*)
For[n = 4, n < 32, n++,
For
[
i = 2, i < n, i++, If
[∑n
k=i+1
1
k−2 ≤ 12 , i && Break[]
]]
;
b[n] = i
]
Clear[a, n, j];
a[n ]:=Ceiling
[(
1+4n−
√
(1+4n)2−12((n−2)b[n]+2(n+1)+(b[n]−2)(2n−4)
∑n
j=b[n]
1
j−2)
)
6
]
; (*Define the threshold an*)
For[n = 3, n < 32, n++,
If[a[n]− b[n] > 0,Print[n] && Break[]] (*This verifies that an < bn for 3 ≤ n ≤ 31*)
]
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Clear[i, j, n, x];
For[n = 3, n < 32, n++,
For[j = 1, j < a[n], j++,
For[x = 1, x ≤ j, x++,
If
[
y[n, j, x] ≥ 1
j+1
∗∑j+1i=1 v[n, j + 1, i],Print[{n, j, x}] && Break[]]
]
]
] (*This verifies Lemma 2.3 for 3 ≤ n ≤ 31*)
Clear[i, j, n];
For[n = 3, n < 32, n++,
For[j = a[n], j < b[n], j++,
If
[
y[n, j, 2] < 1
j+1
∗∑j+1i=1 v[n, j + 1, i] ∥∥∥y[n, j, 1] ≥ 1j+1 ∗∑j+1i=1 v[n, j + 1, i]∥∥∥
y[n, j, 3] ≥ 1
j+1
∗∑j+1i=1 v[n, j + 1, i],Print[{n, j, x}] && Break[]]
]
] (*This verifies Lemma 2.4 for 3 ≤ n ≤ 31*)
Clear[i, j, n];
For[n = 3, n < 32, n++,
For[j = b[n], j < n, j++,
If
[
y[n, j, 1] ≥ 1
j+1
∗∑j+1i=1 v[n, j + 1, i] ∥∥∥y[n, j, 2] < 1j+1 ∗∑j+1i=1 v[n, j + 1, i]∥∥∥
y[n, j, 3] < 1
j+1
∗∑j+1i=1 v[n, j + 1, i],Print[{n, j}] && Break[]]
]
] (*This verifies Lemma 2.5 for 3 ≤ n ≤ 31*)
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